

An Examination of the Relationship between Qishan and the Daoguang Emperor during the Opium Wars

Yongxu Li

School of Archaeology and Cultural Heritage, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou, Henan, 450001, China

ABSTRACT

At the historical turning point of the Opium War, the Daoguang Emperor and Qishan undoubtedly played a key role in influencing the direction of the war. Although the research on the personal images of Qishan and Daoguang Emperor has been relatively adequate, the in-depth discussion on the changes in their relationship during the Opium War has rarely been addressed. The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of the relationship between the Daoguang Emperor and Qishan and the reasons behind it in the context of the Opium War. At the same time, through meticulous historical evidence, this paper reveals the complexity of the high-level political relationship between the Qing Dynasty during the Opium War and its impact on the direction of the war.

KEYWORDS

Qishan; Emperor Daoguang; personal relationships; Opium War

1 Introduction

Emperor Daoguang and Qi Shan both played significant roles during the First Opium War. Emperor Daoguang's indecisive decisions failed to effectively counter the British invasion, leading to the defeat in the war and the signing of unequal treaties. As the Imperial Commissioner, Qi Shan did contribute to the negotiations and defense, but his conciliatory attitude and failure to effectively resist the British forces also exacerbated the defeat in the war.

The current academic research on the Opium War, Lin Zexu, Qishan, and the Daoguang Emperor has been quite in-depth, however, the research on the relationship between Qishan and the Daoguang Emperor during the Opium War is relatively insufficient, especially for the whole period of the Opium War, the exploration of the evolution of their relationship has yet to be further explored in depth.

This paper divides the Opium War into the early, middle and late stages, and analyzes in detail the complex evolution of the relationship between the two men from a high degree of trust to gradual estrangement, and then to the eventual restoration of trust. At the same time, it further explores the factors affecting the relationship between the two, including Qishan's family background, character and talent, the changes in the Daoguang Emperor's policy of "suppression and pacification", and the intervention of the British powers. In addition, British military pressure and policy differences within the Qing court were the core reasons for the breakdown of their relationship, while Qishan's personal characteristics and the Daoguang Emperor's indecisiveness also played a key role.

2 The research on the relationship between the two during various periods of the Opium War

During the reign of Emperor Daoguang, the Qing Dynasty was in the late stage of feudal society, with the national power gradually weakening and internal contradictions becoming increasingly complex. During this period, the Western powers rose rapidly through the Industrial Revolution, actively seeking overseas markets to dump goods and acquire resources. As the most powerful capitalist country at the time, Britain turned its attention to China, hoping to open up the Chinese market through trade, but was restricted by China's traditional tributary trade system and the policy of seclusion.

Qishan, BORJIGIT, born in the fifty-fifth year of the Qianlong reign (1790), was a native of the Zhenghuang Banner in Manchuria. His father, Chengde, served as a general in Hangzhou and as the capital of Jehol. Qishan did not enter the government through the imperial examinations, but at the age of 16, he was awarded the post of Minister of Criminal Affairs as a yin sheng, and then served as Minister of Criminal Affairs, Deputy Minister of General Affairs, Minister of Henan Province, and Minister of Prefecture of Jiangning and Henan Province. His life spanned the four dynasties of Qianlong, Jiaqing, Daoguang, and Xianfeng, and especially in the three dynasties of Jiaqing, Daoguang, and Xianfeng, he was regarded as an able official and played an important role in the political arena.^[1] Although Qishan was disciplined many times for improper measures in dealing with political affairs, he was always able to turn dangers into opportunities and was repeatedly reappointed to important positions. During the Opium War, he was reappointed by the Daoguang Emperor to negotiate with the Western powers on behalf of the Qing Dynasty. Qishan played a key role in the defeat of the Opium War and his influence cannot be ignored.

These two historical figures played pivotal roles in the Opium War. One was a monarch and the other was a subject, and they had a close relationship with each other. However, throughout the Opium War, their relationship showed subtle changes as it evolved at different stages, generally showing a complex process from initial deep trust, to gradual estrangement, and ultimately restoration of trust.

2.1 Pre-Opium War relationship between the two: high trust and harmony

Before the outbreak of the Opium War, Qishan began his brilliant career with his outstanding talent and profound background. The Daoguang Emperor also trusted and recognized Qisan, and the relationship between the two was harmonious.

Qishan "political sound outstanding, Emperor Xuanzong to reward", Daoguang Emperor on its favor exceptionally, said "I am happy to get the celebration of the people, thou heir when doubling the loyalty and diligence, in order to support the governance, in order to deputy appointment, forever Mu state grace in the infinite also." Qishun out of the general into the prime minister, high-ranking officials, God's favor does not fail. It can be said, to 1840 Opium War, he was the most important person, the holy favor is long. Reached the apex of his life, for his colleagues can not be expected.

Daoguang two years (1822), Qishan acting governor of Shandong, inherited his father's first-class marquis, favored by the Daoguang Emperor. At the same time, Qishan is a bold, loud voice, for the official open and relaxed. Daoguang four years (1824), Henan storm disaster, at this time Qishan even if he has left Henan to Shandong governor, but he still took the initiative to raise eight hundred thousand taels of silver relief, reflecting its public and selfless, the Daoguang Emperor was very pleased. Daoguang five years (1825) in the first month, the Daoguang Emperor Qishan evaluation "Ming dry have for, work hard," so in his "Shandong governor" position before adding "the title of the Governor". Can be seen at this time the Daoguang emperor so trust and value. Daoguang nine years (1829), Mew Sichuan Governor. In the eleventh year of the Daoguang period (1831), he was appointed as the Governor of Zhili, who was the first of the ministers of the Daoguang period. Daoguang sixteen years (1838), to shade origin Qishan was awarded the title of associate university professor, enjoying the honor. Daoguang eighteen years (1840), and worship for the Wen Yuange University, still stay in the Governor-General of Zhili, the official ranked first class.^[2]

In addition, Qishan in addition to successively served as governor of Shandong and the Governor of the two rivers and other important positions, but also as Governor of the canal, responsible for the country's financial lifeblood.^[3] This series of job promotion, not only highlights Qishan's excellent administrative ability, but also from the side of the Daoguang Emperor's deep trust and high recognition, as well as the relationship between the two harmonious and cordial.

2.2 Relationship between the two during the Opium War: Qishan was abolished and moved toward separation

In June 1840, The Qing Dynasty and Britain were in constant conflict, leading to the outbreak of the Opium War. During this period, Qishan and the Daoguang Emperor as the main historical and political figures in the war, the relationship between the two also changed in the war, from trust to suspicion, Qishan also from being reused to be deposed.

In August 1840, after the fall of Dinghai, Qishan was ordered to go to Guangdong to negotiate with the British and barbarians, and the Daoguang Emperor hoped that Qishan would be able to "realize the sacred will" and solve the trouble caused by Lin Zexu. When Qishan was ordered to negotiate in Guangzhou, the Daoguang Emperor gave him the negotiation policy: "the upper can not lose the national body, the lower can not open the border", hoping for the success of the negotiations. But the negotiation just started, the Daoguang emperor change "to caress the barbarians" attitude, he warned Qishan: "such as to blackmail endless, can be tied up on the one hand, one side of the defense, the other side of the request for the deployment of troops." December 25, and Oracle Qishan: "with Qishan detailed investigation, secret detectives. On the one hand, and the razor's eye to discuss ji soldiers, on the one hand, decorative battalion martial arts, selection of generals and guns, must be able to ship, must be able to sail driving, properly arranged, not less negligence."^[4] In early 1841, when Yiliu "to start a war to blackmail" after the Daoguang decree to let Qishan to prepare "to do things", "take advantage of the opportunity to attack and annihilate, do not have to show weakness", and ordered Sichuan, Hunan, Guizhou Prepare 4,000 soldiers, waiting for Qishan to deploy. "The barbarians asked too much, the situation is arrogant, neither reason can be Oracle, that is, when the great attack ... the barbarians and then or delivery of the word, are not allowed to accept, and are not allowed to send people to the barbarians theory ... my will has been set, no wandering".^[5] When Qishan reported that "the terrain of the no key to choke", "armaments of the no profit to rely on", "the military strength of the not solid", "the people of the not solid", "Legitimate claim that the fence is difficult to rely on, the fight is really unsure", so it is better to "tie up temporarily",^[6] Daoguang Emperor was very angry, with Zhu biao reprimanded Qishan said "I am not like you are willing to accept the barbarian I am not like you are willing to be bullied and teased by the barbarians, lost but not return, dare to back my decree, still receiving and delivering the book,

pleading on behalf of the reverse, really out of reason, what is the non-fortunate? Incompetence is unbearable! You are being intimidated, willing to do this for a thousand years of bad reputation, and recently raised a number of ends to intimidate me, I am not afraid of.”^[7] On the same day, the Qing court to Qishan on behalf of the British request, to “dismissed the university, pulling off the plume, still handing over to the ministry of the punishment of severe punishment”.^[8] February 6, the Qing court received Yiliang exposed Qishan private cut Hong Kong's son of the folders that “kuen misrepresentation of the country, it is the loss of conscience” of the charge, Qishan “dismissed from his post lock up, escorted to the Beijing, strictly interrogated. All of Qishan's family properties were seized by the government.”^[9]

It can be seen that during the outbreak of the Opium War, due to the Daoguang Emperor's personal attitude towards the barbarians, the strict hierarchical system of monarchs and ministers in the Qing Dynasty, as well as the intervention of the Great Powers and other factors, Qishan's path to the officialdom was interrupted and abolished, and at the same time, his trust with the Daoguang Emperor collapsed and he went to the separation.

2.3 Relationship between the two in the late Opium War: trust restored, appointment to office

With the development of the opium wars and the end of the qishun in the Manchu governor is considered more talented, the past also has some achievements, the dao guang emperor still rely on it. In the winter of 1842, once again Qishan, rewarded to the fourth class guards, sent to Yarkand to help the minister, punished the side of the effectiveness of the atonement. 1843 March, and rewarded three top belt, for the hot river. Soon impeached by the imperial historian Chen Qingyong, pursued in the opium wars in the crime of instigating the wrongdoing of the country. The Daoguang Emperor also knew that the punishment and reward is not equal, so deposed Qishan official position, so that he closed the door to think about, in order to recognize the fairness of reward and punishment. However, the dao guang emperor is a person of indecisiveness, the change of the morning, qi shan “still want to use the countryside, not a few, to the third class guards, minister of Tibet”.^[10] 1943 December, qi shan once again become a big official, was awarded the minister of the office of Tibet.^[11]

Before Qishan became the minister in Tibet, the regent of the second Cemurin living Buddha was “monopolizing all things, and making a fuss”, and the ministers in Tibet were often “too humble” and “belittled”, which led to a lot of problems in Tibet. Tibet was plagued with local ills. Qishan to Tibet, carried out a radical reform. Qishan and Zhong Fang and other people together, for the regency of the ills, put forward the “cut ban on business on the accumulation of bad statute” 28, investigated and dealt with the “Samadhi Bakshi Ngawang descending white Chuchen Gyaltsen case”, at the same time in the military, the economy has also taken a series of measures. Qishan's reform in Tibet was aimed at maintaining the effective rule of the Qing central government in Tibet, and his administrative measures were the revision and supplementation of the twenty-nine articles of the “Qindin Tibetan Internal Rehabilitation Statutes” issued from the fifty-seventh to the fifty-eighth year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong.^[12]

However, Qishan in Tibet initiatives, although trying to strengthen the governance of Tibet, but the Qing court in the opium wars, increasingly corrupt and declining, the national situation is more weak, the minister in Tibet gradually lost control of Tibetan politics, Qishan is also difficult to save the day. And Qishan although as a feudal official, but gave up the “audit checking office business and Zashilunbu all the cashier” of the financial audit and supervision rights as well as the training of the Tibetan army command, which is also the Qing government governance of Tibet laid a hidden danger.

3 An Examination of the Factors Affecting the Relationship Between the Two in the Opium War Period

3.1 Qishan's Personal Family Background, Character and Talents

Qishan's personal fate, whether it was his early rise to the political stage, his trust and reuse during the Opium War, or his dismissal at a later stage, as well as his reappointment by the Daoguang Emperor after the end of the war, were all closely related to his character, talent, and family background.

As mentioned above, Qisan initially entered the officialdom as a shade student, which was closely related to his prominent family background. Even when Qishan was raided, from his home seized 682 pounds of gold, silver 1794 two, and 11 boxes of jewelry, all of which were surrendered to the treasury. At the same time, his centuries-old family background also laid a solid foundation for his later reuse by the Daoguang Emperor.^[13]

Secondly, Qishan showed extraordinary foresight and excellent ability in national defense, which far surpassed other frontier ministers of his contemporaries. This also foretold his fate of being deposed at the end of the Opium War. Upon his arrival in Guangdong, Qishan was at the forefront of dealing with the affairs of the barbarians. Through contacts and observations, he realized the inadequacy of China's military power and the disparity between its strength and that of the British, and thus he turned to the strategy of peace.^[14] However, this was contrary to the intention of the Daoguang Emperor, which eventually led to his abolition and the rupture of his relationship with the Daoguang Emperor.

However, in addition to the above advantages, Qishan's personal character was tyrannical and limited, and he appeared to be incompetent in imperial affairs, which was closely related to the collapse of the Daoguang Emperor's relationship. Qishan's biggest problem in Guangdong was the over-centralization of power. He considered himself exclusively responsible for the affairs of the sea port, never delegated to others on foreign affairs, all barbaric affairs are not discussed with the governor, even if the officials below the Department of the Road, without his summons, they are not allowed to enter the house. Qishun did not trust the local officials in Guangdong, where the court sent and sent out the folders and correspondence with the barbarians, never revealed a word and a half to others, but also do not discuss with subordinate officials.^[15] This led to tensions between him and local officials, causing dissatisfaction among local ministers and indirectly accelerating Qishan's dismissal and the disintegration of his relationship with the Daoguang Emperor.

3.2 Changes in the Daoguang Emperor's "Suppression and Pacification" Policy

During the Opium War, the Daoguang Emperor, as the supreme ruler of the Qing Dynasty and the organizer of the war, made a lot of mistakes in decision-making, which directly led to the failure of the war, for which he bears the unshirkable responsibility. At the same time, his wavering foreign policy of war and peace was also the core reason for the deterioration of his relationship with Qishan.

During the Opium War, there were obvious differences within the ruling class of the Qing Dynasty, and the conflict between the surrenderists and the resistanceists was particularly sharp. Emperor Daoguang's attitude towards these two factions resonated and diverged at different stages of the war.^[16] At the beginning of the war, the Daoguang Emperor was inwardly conceited and unwilling to bow to foreign invaders easily. When the news of Dinghai's defeat and the British army's move northward reached Beijing, the Qing government was in a state of extreme panic. In addition to ordering the dismissal of the governor of Zhejiang Urgong Er and other people's position and ask them to make a merit, the Daoguang emperor also quickly instructed the governor of Zhejiang and Zhejiang, Deng Tingzhen sent Fujian navy north to assist Zhejiang to fight against the enemy, and ordered the governor of the two rivers, Ilibu selected thousands of soldiers of the navy on standby. At this time, the Daoguang Emperor did not show obvious weakness, but emphasized to "re-orally the generals and governors to order will be bent, serious training inspections, and prevention and blocking, always when the first thing to Yu Chip, do not have to be temporary constraints. Even the slightest negligence, so that the barbarians and other scurrying into the inner ocean, ravaging and disturbing."^[17] This reflects his position of active defense. At this time, Lin Zexu's work was unfavorable, while Qishan ushered in the opportunity of history and began to be reused.

On August 6, 1840, Qishan made it clear in his memorial that although the British army had not yet arrived near Tianjin, he had "arrived in Tianjin first" and foresaw that the British army "would certainly arrive in Tianjin" with bad intentions. Therefore, he suggested to the court to make military preparations in advance. This shows that Qishan was not initially inclined to peace talks, but took the initiative to mobilize troops to guard the Tianjin sea port.^[18]

During this period, Qishan showed a proactive attitude in military strategy and deployment, saving for a rainy day, which coincided with the Daoguang Emperor's idea. At the same time, the Daoguang Emperor also refused the officials for the British army, "relay" request, prevention, once the situation is found to be wrong, the camera can be eliminated, the attitude is quite positive and tough. It can be seen, this period, both the Daoguang Emperor or Qishan, in the British attitude and diplomacy are active and tough, fearless, and the relationship between the two gradually become close.

As Qishan began to transmit notes on behalf of the British, he became an important source of information for the Qing court to understand the situation and intentions of the British army, and also became a bridge between the British army and the Qing court. Qishan in accordance with the Daoguang Emperor's "not to lose the national body, the lower not to open the border provocations" under the overall guiding principle, on behalf of the British army to declare "grievances" and return to the South as a condition, and the British side to "bargaining" "The British were not allowed to return to the South, but to make a bargain with the British."^[19] Finally, on September 20, 1840, YiLu and YiLu once again note Qishan, implying that the British army has begun to go south. The British troops went south as promised, which pleased the Daoguang Emperor and Qishan, and convinced them of the correctness of the policy of "main pacification". Therefore, the Daoguang Emperor's attitude towards the British army gradually changed from toughness to moderation, from the main suppression to agree with Qishan's "peace and comfort", foreign policy in this stage of the obvious changes. The relationship between the two men became better and better, and Qishan gained the deeper trust of the Daoguang Emperor.^[20]

After the end of the Tianjin Dagou talks, Qishan was ordered to go south and continue to be responsible for dealing with British affairs. Throughout the negotiation process, Qishan made concessions step by step, but the road of negotiation was still bumpy. The Daoguang Emperor did not understand China's military situation, and he stuck to the idea of "heavenly dynasty", giving orders in Beijing, and gradually shifted from the main "caressing" to supporting "suppression". However, when Qishan fought against the British in Guangdong, he knew the gap between the Chinese

and British military forces: the British had advanced ships, firearms that could be used both near and far, deadly flying cannons, and advanced weapons such as canisters, rockets, muskets, fireballs, etc., which were all lacking in the Qing army. Therefore, Qishan that the gap between the two sides of the military strength, coupled with the British side constantly threatened to force, Qishan had to "caress the barbarians", privately agreed to the British side of the conditions. But the British side to inch forward, Qishan in the situation is also forced to step back.^[21] So far, Qishan and the Daoguang Emperor's advocate of the barbarians against the Taoist, the Daoguang Emperor in the central heard immediately dismissed and punished Qishan, and then dispatched Yishan to Guangdong to fight against the British. The close relationship between the Daoguang Emperor and Qishan also broke down.

Thus, throughout the Opium War, the Daoguang Emperor's three shifts in foreign policy attitudes - from war to peace to war - significantly affected his relationship with Qishan. When they shared the same views based on national interests, Qishan usually gained the Daoguang Emperor's trust and appreciation. However, when they held different opinions based on the actual situation and serious contradictions and disagreements arose, in order to maintain the decency of the country, the Daoguang Emperor, as the monarch, often decided to dismiss Qishan.

3.3 Intervention by the British Powers

During the Opium War, the Qing Dynasty and the United Kingdom were the belligerent parties. The intervention of the British powers is extremely crucial when analyzing the factors that influenced the changes in the relationship between the Daoguang Emperor and Qishan throughout the Opium War.

Before the outbreak of the Opium War, the four most important ministers of the Daoguang Emperor included Tao Shu, the governor of Jiangxi, Qishan, the governor of Zhili, the governor of Yunnan and Guizhou, and the governor of Hunan and Guangdong, Lin Zexu. This fact highlights the importance of Qishan in the heart of the Daoguang Emperor. However, on December 31, 1838, the Daoguang Emperor appointed Lin Zexu as the Minister of Qin, "to investigate the incident of the Haikou, all the province's naval forces, and under the control".^[22] With this appointment, the fate of Qishan and Lin Zexu began to undergo a dramatic transformation, and the relationship between them and the Daoguang Emperor also became confusing.

Upon his arrival in Guangzhou, Lin Zexu adopted resolute anti-smoking and national defense measures, which touched upon the interests of Britain. This fundamental change not only laid the groundwork for the Sino-British war and Britain's demand for Lin Zexu's severe punishment, but also implied that Qishan would take over Lin Zexu's handling of opium affairs with Britain.

In October 1839, the conflicts between the United Kingdom and the Qing Dynasty continued to escalate. At the end of April of the following year, the Britain fleet departed and arrived at the sea of Guangdong in June, the British announced the blockade of the port of Guangzhou, and then moved northward to invade at the end of June, capturing Dinghai on July 5. On August 11, Yulu and Yilu arrived at the mouth of the Baihe River at the head of their ships and then the Qing court and the British launched a few days of negotiations and contests. 19 August, Qishan submitted a note from Barzun, who cited the unauthorized violence inflicted on the British who relied on the Qing state by Lin Zexu in Guangzhou, and that this official was light-hearted in his treatment of opium. violence and that the official had treated the British-appointed consular post with contempt and imposed coercion and insults on him, Barzun put forward unreasonable demands including compensation for opium expenses, equal interaction between Chinese and British officials, the cession of islands to Britain, the settlement of commercial debts, and the payment of military expenses and threatened to continue the war if the Qing government refused.^[23]

During the many rounds of negotiations between Qishan and British representatives, the British side continuously expressed their strong dissatisfaction with Lin Zexu. In view of the British continued accusations and criticisms of court officials, the Daoguang Emperor dismissed Lin Zexu on October 3 for "misleading the country and hurting the people, and mishandling the situation", which marked the end of the Tianjin negotiations. After the end of Tianjin negotiation, Britain decided to go south, Daoguang Emperor mistakenly thought that the tie-up policy adopted by Qishan and himself had been effective, and failed to realize that the British army actually went south in order to make use of the surrender faction within the imperial court and to build up their strength for the invasion of China.^[24] Therefore, at this time, Qishan was deeply trusted by Daoguang Emperor. However, this also marked the beginning of the disintegration of the relationship of trust between them.

On October 3, 1840, the Daoguang Emperor appointed Qishan as a minister of imperial affairs to go to Guangdong to "investigate the incident". As mentioned earlier, although both Qishan and the Daoguang Emperor's original intention was to defend the national interests and expel the invaders, the differences between Qishan and the Daoguang Emperor in dealing with the strategy of "extermination" and "pacification" of foreign powers became the most crucial issue in their relationship. However, it was the intervention of the British powers and the difference in their understanding of the British powers that led them to hold different positions on the policy towards the barbarians.

Upon his arrival in Guangdong, Qishan immediately started negotiations with Britain and applied the "victorious peace experience" he had gained from the Dagou Talks to the negotiation table in Guangzhou in order to continue to push forward the policy of peace. However, at the beginning of the negotiation, the British put forward unreasonable demands and threatened to attack Humen to solve the problem by force if these demands were not met. In the process, Qishan gradually compromised and yielded in order to avoid an armed conflict, trying to make the smallest sacrifice in exchange for peace. However, on January 7, 1841, due to unsuccessful negotiations, the British decided to resort to forceful suppression and launched a sudden attack, capturing the Dajiao Shajiao Battery, which led to heavy casualties suffered by the Qing troops. The threat of force forced Qishan to further reduce the posture, beyond the terms of reference, privately committed to the scheduled opening of Guangzhou in exchange for the invasion of Shajiao, Dajiao, and on the issue of Hong Kong, said that "on behalf of the plan to do the best", "stop choosing a place to moor ships".^[25] However, for the British attack, the Daoguang Emperor Qishan's constant forbearance confused and angry, decided to the British army "big stretch tartar".^[26] Subsequently, the British quickly took the initiative and attacked the Humen Fortress on February 23, 1841, and Guan Tianpei and more than 400 generals all sacrificed their lives, and the Humen Fortress was lost.

It can be seen that the continuous pressure and threat from Britain indirectly led to the resignation of Lin Zexu and the succession of Qishan. The strategy and tactics of the British army directly prompted Qishan and the Daoguang Emperor to have changes and differences in their foreign policies.

4 Summarize

In the early stages of the Opium War, Qishan, with his outstanding talent and strong background, gained the deep trust of the Daoguang Emperor, and the two had a cordial relationship; however, as the war progressed, due to the Daoguang Emperor's indecisiveness on foreign policy and Qishan's concessionary stance in dealing with the affairs of the British army, their relationship deteriorated rapidly, and Qishan was dismissed from his post; at the end of the war, the Daoguang Emperor once again activated Qishan and assigned him to serve as the Minister of Tibet, thus repairing the relationship.

During the Opium War, the Daoguang Emperor's relationship with Qishan experienced a transformation from trust and estrangement to re-activation, a process that profoundly reflected the contradictions and dilemmas within the ruling group of the Qing Dynasty at that time. Qishan, as an important official relied on by the Daoguang Emperor, had his personal destiny closely linked to the fluctuations of the court's policies, and the intervention of the British powers further aggravated this complexity. The instability of the Daoguang Emperor's policy of "suppression and pacification" conflicted with Qishan's strategy of peace, which ultimately led to the breakdown of their relationship. However, after the end of the war, the Daoguang emperor's reappointment of Qishan demonstrated his attachment and trust in this capable official.

This history not only records the changing relationship between the two historical figures, but also epitomizes the major historical event of the Opium War. It cautions us that internal unity and firmness in decision-making are crucial in the face of external pressures, while the intertwining of personal destiny with the fate of the nation deserves our deepest consideration.

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